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Sanford Levinson t
One of the best known pieces of American popular art in this century is
the New Yorker cover by Saul Steinberg presenting a map of the United
States as seen by a New Yorker. As most readers can no doubt recall,
Manhattan dominates the map; everything west of the Hudson is more or
less collapsed together and minimally displayed to the viewer. Steinberg's
great cover depends for its force on the reality of what social psychologists
call "cognitive maps." If one asks inhabitants ostensibly of the same cities
to draw maps of that city, one will quickly discover that the images car-
ried around in people's minds will vary by race, social class, and the like.
What is true of maps of places-that they differ according to the perspec-
tives of the mapmakers-is certainly true of all conceptual maps.
To continue the map analogy, consider in this context the Bill of
Rights: Is there an agreed upon "projection" of the concept? Is there even
a canonical text of the Bill of Rights? Does it include the first eight, nine,
t Charles Tilford McCormick Professor of Law, University of Texas Law School. This essay was
initially prepared for delivery at a symposium on Interpretation and the Bill of Rights at Williams
College on November 4, 1988. I am grateful for the thought and effort put into that conference by its
organizer, Professor Mark Taylor. It was he who arranged for Wendy Brown, then a member of the
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Two long-distance friends and colleagues, Akhil Reed Amar and Stephen Siegel, contributed special
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or ten Amendments to the Constitution?1 Imagine two individuals who
are asked to draw a "map" of the Bill of Rights. One is a (stereo-) typical
member of the American Civil Liberties Union (of which I am a card-
carrying member); the other is an equally (stereo-) typical member of the
"New Right." The first, I suggest, would feature the First Amendment2
as Main Street, dominating the map, though more, one suspects, in its
role as protector of speech and prohibitor of established religion than as
guardian of the rights of religious believers. The other principal avenues
would be the criminal procedure aspects of the Constitution drawn from
the Fourth,3  Fifth,4  Sixth,5 and Eighth6 Amendments. Also depicted
prominently would be the Ninth Amendment,' although perhaps as in the
process of construction. I am confident that the ACLU map would ex-
clude any display of the just compensation clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment8 or of the Tenth Amendment."
The second map, drawn by the New Rightist, would highlight the free
1. It is not irrelevant that the Bill of Rights submitted to the states in 1789 included not only
what are now the first ten Amendments, but also two others. Indeed, what we call the First Amend-
ment was only the third one of the list submitted to the states. The initial "first amendment" in fact
concerned the future size of the House of Representatives, a topic of no small importance to the Anti-
Federalists, who were appalled by the smallness of the House seemingly envisioned by the Philadel-
phia framers. The second prohibited any pay raise voted by members of Congress to themselves from
taking effect until an election "shall have intervened." See J. GOEBEL, 1 THE OLIVER WENDELL
HoLMEs DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND
BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 442 n.162 (1971). Had all of the initial twelve proposals been ratified, we
would, it is possible, have a dramatically different cognitive map of the Bill of Rights. At the very
least, one would neither hear defenses of the "preferred" status of freedom of speech framed in terms
of the "firstness" of (what we know as) the First Amendment, nor the wholly invalid inference drawn
from that "firstness" of some special intention of the Framers to safeguard the particular rights laid
out there.
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants shall issue but upon prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in
the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend VI.
6. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual pun-
ishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
7. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
8. "[Nlor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
9. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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exercise clause of the First Amendment, 0 the just compensation clause of
the Fifth Amendment," and the Tenth Amendment." Perhaps the most
notable difference between the two maps, though, would be in regard to
the Second Amendment: "A well regulated Militia being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms
shall not be infringed." What would be at most only a blind alley for the
ACLU mapmaker would, I am confident, be a major boulevard in the
map drawn by the New Right adherent. It is this last anomaly that I
want to explore in this essay.
I. THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETING THE SECOND AMENDMENT
To put it mildly, the Second Amendment is not at the forefront of con-
stitutional discussion, at least as registered in what the academy regards as
the venues for such discussion-law reviews,"3 casebooks, 4 and other
10. "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise thereof [religion]. U.S.
CONST. amend I.
11. See supra note 8.
12. See supra note 9.
13. There are several law review articles discussing the Amendment. See, e.g., Lund, supra note
a- nd the articles cited in Dowlut & Knoop, State Constitutions and the Right to Keep and Bear
Arms, 7 OKLA. CITY U.L. REv. 177, 178 n.3 (1982). See also the valuable symposium on Gun
Control, edited by Don Kates, in 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1-267 (1986), including articles by
Shalhope, The Armed Citizen in the Early Republic, at 125; Kates, The Second Amendment: A Dia-
logue, at 143; Halbrook, What the Framers Intended: A Linguistic Analysis of the Right to "Bear
Arms," at 151. The symposium also includes a valuable bibliography of published materials on gun
control, including Second Amendment considerations, at 251-67. The most important single article is
almost undoubtedly Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amend-
ment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1983). Not the least significant aspect of Kates' article is that it is
basically the only one to have appeared in an "elite" law review. However, like many of the authors
of other Second Amendment pieces, Kates is a practicing lawyer rather than a legal academic. I think
it is accurate to say that no one recognized by the legal academy as a "major" writer on constitutional
law has deigned to turn his or her talents to a full consideration of the Amendment. But see LaRue,
Constitutional Law and Constitutional History, 36 BUFFALO L. REV. 373, 375-78 (1988) (briefly
discussing Second Amendment). Akhil Reed Amar's reconsideration of the foundations of the Consti-
tution also promises to delve more deeply into the implications of the Amendment. See Amar, Of
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1495-1500 (1987). Finally, there is one book that
provides more in-depth treatment of the Second Amendment: S. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE
ARMED, THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (1984).
George Fletcher, in his study of the Berhard Goetz case, also suggests that Second Amendment
analysis is not frivolous, though he does not elaborate the point. G. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-
DEFENSE 156-58, 210-11 (1988).
One might well find this overt reference to "elite" law reviews and "major" writers objectionable,
but it is foolish to believe that these distinctions do not exist within the academy or, more importantly,
that we cannot learn about the sociology of academic discourse through taking them into account. No
one can plausibly believe that the debates that define particular periods of academic discourse are a
simple reflection of "natural" interest in the topic. Nothing helps an issue so much as its being taken
up r, an obsession by a distinguished professor from, say, Harvard or Yale.
14 One will search the "leading" casebooks in vain for any mention of the Second Amendment.
Other than its being included in the text of the Constitution that all of the casebooks reprint, a reader
would have no reason to believe that the Amendment exists or could possibly be of interest to the
constitutional analyst. I must include, alas, P. BREST & S. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL DECiSIONMAKING (2d ed. 1983), within this critique, though I have every reason to believe
that this will not be true of the forthcoming third edition.
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scholarly legal publications. As Professor LaRue has recently written,
"the second amendment is not taken seriously by most scholars."' 5
Both Laurence Tribe'6 and the Illinois team of Nowak, Rotunda, and
Young 17 at least acknowledge the existence of the Second Amendment in
their respective treatises on constitutional law, perhaps because the trea-
tise genre demands more encyclopedic coverage than does the casebook.
Neither, however, pays it the compliment of extended analysis. Both
marginalize the Amendment by relegating it to footnotes; it becomes what
a deconstructionist might call a "supplement" to the ostensibly "real"
Constitution that is privileged by discussion in the text.", Professor
Tribe's footnote appears as part of a general discussion of congressional
power. He asserts that the history of the Amendment "indicate[s] that the
central concern of [its] framers was to prevent such federal interferences
with the state militia as would permit the establishment of a standing
national army and the consequent destruction of local autonomy."' 9 He
does note, however, that "the debates surrounding congressional approval
of the second amendment do contain references to individual self-
protection as well as to states' rights," but he argues that the presence of
the preamble to the Amendment, as well as the qualifying phrase "'well
regulated' makes any invocation of the amendment as a restriction on state
or local gun control measures extremely problematic." 2 Nowak, Rotunda,
and Young mention the Amendment in the context of the incorporation
controversy, though they discuss its meaning at slightly greater length.2'
They state that "[t]he Supreme Court has not determined, at least not
with any clarity, whether the amendment protects only a right of state
governments against federal interference with state militia and police
forces . . . or a right of individuals against the federal and state
government[s]."22
Clearly the Second Amendment is not the only ignored patch of text in
our constitutional conversations. One will find extraordinarily little dis-
cussion about another one of the initial Bill of Rights, the Third Amend-
ment: "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, with-
15. LaRue, supra note 13, at 375.
16. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988).
17. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1986).
18. For a brilliant and playful meditation on the way the legal world treats footnotes and other
marginal phenomena, see Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U.L. REV. 275, 276-81 (1989).
19. TRIBE, supra note 16, at 299 n.6.
20. Id.; see also J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 95 (1980) ("ITIhe framers and ratifiers
. . .opted against leaving to the future the attribution of [other] purposes, choosing instead explicitly
to legislate the goal in terms of which the provision was to be interpreted."). As shall be seen below,
see infra text accompanying note 38, the preamble may be less plain in its meaning than Tribe's (and
Ely's) confident argument suggests.
21. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 17, at 316 n.4. They do go on to cite a
spate of articles by scholars who have debated the issue.
22. Id. at 316 n.4.
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out the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be
prescribed by law." Nor does one hear much about letters of marque and
reprisal2 3 or the granting of titles of nobility. 24 There are, however, some
differences that are worth noting.
The Third Amendment, to take the easiest case, is ignored because it is
in fact of no current importance whatsoever (although it did, for obvious
reasons, have importance at the time of the founding). It has never, for a
single instant, been viewed by any body of modern lawyers or groups of
laity as highly relevant to their legal or political concerns. For this reason,
there is almost no caselaw on the Amendment.25 I suspect that few among
even the highly sophisticated readers of this Journal can summon up the
Amendment without the aid of the text.
The Second Amendment, though, is radically different from these other
pieces of constitutional text just mentioned, which all share the attribute
of being basically irrelevant to any ongoing political struggles. To grasp
the difference, one might simply begin by noting that it is not at all un-
usual for the Second Amendment to show up in letters to the editors of
newspapers and magazines.26 That judges and academic lawyers, includ-
ing the ones who write casebooks, ignore it is most certainly not evidence
for the proposition that no one cares about it. The National Rifle Associa-
tion, to name the most obvious example, cares deeply about the Amend-
ment, and an apparently serious Senator of the United States averred that
the right to keep and bear arms is the "right most valued by free men."27
Campaigns for Congress in both political parties, and even presidential
23. U S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
24. US. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
25. See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 923 (1964), which quotes the
Amendment and then a comment from MILLER, THE CONSTITUTION 646 (1893): "This amendment
scems to have been thought necessary. It does not appear to have been the subject of judicial exposi-
tion; and it is so thoroughly in accord with our ideas, that further comment is unnecessary." Cf.
Engblom v. Carey, 724 F2d 28 (2d Cir. 1983), affg 572 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Engblom
grew out of a "statewide strike of correction officers, when they were evicted from their facility-
residences .. and members of the National Guard were housed in their residences without their
consent." The district court had initially granted summary judgment for the defendants in a suit
brought by the officers claiming a deprivation of their rights under the Third Amendment. The Sec-
ond Circuit, however, reversed on the ground that it could not "say that as a matter of law appellants
were not entitled to the protection of the Third Amendment." Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 964
(2d Cie 1982). The District Court on remand held that, as the Third Amendment rights had not
been clearly established at the time of the strike, the defendants were protected by a qualified immu-
nity, and it is thi\ opinion that was upheld by the Second Circuit. I am grateful to Mark Tushnet for
bringing this case to my attention.
26. See, e.g., The Firearms the Second Amendment Protects, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1988, at A22,
col. 2 (three letters); Second Amendment and Gun Control, L.A. Times, March 11, 1989, Part II, at
9 col. I (nine letters); What 'Right to Bear Arms'?, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1989, at A23, col. 1
(national ed ) (op. ed. essay by Daniel Abrams); see also We Rebelled To Protect Our Gun Rights,
Washington Times, July 20, 1989, at F2, col. 4.
27. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE
RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. viii (1982) (preface by Senator Orrin Hatch)
[hereinafter THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS].
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campaigns, may turn on the apparent commitment of the candidates to a
particular view of the Second Amendment. This reality of the political
process reflects the fact that millions of Americans, even if (or perhaps
especially if) they are not academics, can quote the Amendment and
would disdain any presentation of the Bill of Rights that did not give it a
place of pride.
I cannot help but suspect that the best explanation for the absence of
the Second Amendment from the legal consciousness of the elite bar, in-
cluding that component found in the legal academy,28 is derived from a
mixture of sheer opposition to the idea of private ownership of guns and
the perhaps subconscious fear that altogether plausible, perhaps even
"winning," interpretations of the Second Amendment would present real
hurdles to those of us supporting prohibitory regulation. Thus the title of
this essay-The Embarrassing Second Amendment-for I want to suggest
that the Amendment may be profoundly embarrassing to many who both
support such regulation and view themselves as committed to zealous ad-
herence to the Bill of Rights (such as most members of the ACLU). In-
deed, one sometimes discovers members of the NRA who are equally com-
mitted members of the ACLU, differing with the latter only on the issue
of the Second Amendment but otherwise genuinely sharing the libertarian
viewpoint of the ACLU.
It is not my style to offer "correct" or "incorrect" interpretations of the
Constitution. 9 My major interest is in delineating the rhetorical struc-
tures of American constitutional argument and elaborating what is some-
times called the "politics of interpretation," that is, the factors that ex-
plain why one or another approach will appeal to certain analysts at
certain times, while other analysts, or times, will favor quite different ap-
proaches. Thus my general tendency to regard as wholly untenable any
approach to the Constitution that describes itself as obviously correct and
condemns its opposition as simply wrong holds for the Second Amend-
ment as well. In some contexts, this would lead me to label as tendentious
the certainty of NRA advocates that the Amendment means precisely
what they assert it does. In this particular context-i.e., the pages of a
journal whose audience is much more likely to be drawn from an elite,
liberal portion of the public-I will instead be suggesting that the skepti-
cism should run in the other direction. That is, we might consider the
possibility that "our" views of the Amendment, perhaps best reflected in
Professor Tribe's offhand treatment of it, might themselves be equally de-
serving of the "tendentious" label.
28. See supra notes 13-14.




II. THE RHETORICAL STRUCTURES OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS
My colleague Philip Bobbitt has, in his book Constitutional Fate,"0
spelled out six approaches-or "modalities," as he terms them-of consti-
tutional argument. These approaches, he argues, comprise what might be
termed our legal grammar. They are the rhetorical structures within
which "law-talk" as a recognizable form of conversation is carried on.
The six are as follows:
1) textual argument-appeals to the unadorned language of the text;"1
2) historical argument-appeals to the historical background of the pro-
vision being considered, whether the history considered be general, such as
background but clearly crucial events (such as the American Revolution),
or specific appeals to the so-called intentions of the framers;32
3) structural argument-analyses inferred from the particular struc-
tures established by the Constitution, including the tripartite division of
the national government; the separate existence of both state and nation as
political entities; and the structured role of citizens within the political
order;33
4) doctrinal argument-emphasis on the implications of prior cases de-
cided by the Supreme Court; 4
5) prudential argument-emphasis on the consequences of adopting a
proferred decision in any given case; 35 and, finally,
6) ethical argument-reliance on the overall "ethos" of limited govern-
ment as centrally constituting American political culture.36
I want to frame my consideration of the Second Amendment within the
first five of Bobbitt's categories; they are all richly present in consideration
of what the Amendment might mean. The sixth, which emphasizes the
ethos of limited government, does not play a significant role in the debate
of the Second Amendment.3"
A. Text
I begin with the appeal to text. Recall the Second Amendment: "A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." No one has
30. P. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982).
31. Id. at 25-38.
32. id. at 9-24.
33. Id. at 74-92.
34. Id. at 39-58.
35. Id at 59-73.
36. Id. at 93-119.
37. For the record, I should note that Bobbitt disagrees with this statement, making an eloquent
appeal (in cornersation) on behalf of the classic American value of self-reliance for the defense of
oneself and, perhaps more importantly, one's family. I certainly do not doubt the possibility of con-
structing an "ethical" rationale for limiting the state's power to prohibit private gun ownership.
Nonetheless, I would claim that no one unpersuaded by any of the arguments derived from the first
five modes would suddenly change his or her mind upon being presented with an "ethical" argument.
1989]
The Yale Law Journal
ever described the Constitution as a marvel of clarity, and the Second
Amendment is perhaps one of the worst drafted of all its provisions. What
is special about the Amendment is the inclusion of an opening clause-a
preamble, if you will-that seems to set out its purpose. No similar clause
is a part of any other Amendment, 8 though that does not, of course, mean
that we do not ascribe purposes to them. It would be impossible to make
sense of the Constitution if we did not engage in the ascription of purpose.
Indeed, the major debates about the First Amendment arise precisely
when one tries to discern a purpose, given that "literalism" is a hopelessly
failing approach to interpreting it. We usually do not even recognize pun-
ishment of fraud-a classic speech act-as a free speech problem because
we so sensibly assume that the purpose of the First Amendment could not
have been, for example, to protect the circulation of patently deceptive
information to potential investors in commercial enterprises. The sharp
differences that distinguish those who would limit the reach of the First
Amendment to "political" speech from those who would extend it much
further, encompassing non-deceptive commercial speech, are all derived
from different readings of the purpose that underlies the raw text.39
A standard move of those legal analysts who wish to limit the Second
Amendment's force is to focus on its "preamble" as setting out a restric-
tive purpose. Recall Laurence Tribe's assertion that that purpose was to
allow the states to keep their militias and to protect them against the pos-
sibility that the new national government will use its power to establish a
powerful standing army and eliminate the state militias. This purposive
reading quickly disposes of any notion that there is an "individual" right
to keep and bear arms. The right, if such it be, is only a state's right. The
consequence of this reading is obvious: the national government has the
power to regulate-to the point of prohibition-private ownership of
guns, since that has, by stipulation, nothing to do with preserving state
militias. This is, indeed, the position of the ACLU, which reads the
Amendment as protecting only the right of "maintaining an effective state
militia. . . . [T]he individual's right to bear arms applies only to the
preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated [state] militia. Except for
lawful police and military purposes, the possession of weapons by individ-
uals is not constitutionally protected."40
This is not a wholly implausible reading, but one might ask why the
38. Cf., e.g., the patents and copyrights clause, which sets out the power of Congress "[to pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8.
39. For examples of this, see F. SCHAUER, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY
(1982); Levinson, First Amendment, Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Expression: Does It Matter
What We Call It? 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 767 (1985) (reviewing M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1984)).
40. ACLU Policy #47. I am grateful to Joan Mahoney, a member of the national board of the
ACLU, for providing me with a text of the ACLU's current policy on gun control.
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Framers did not simply say something like "Congress shall have no power
to prohibit state-organized and directed militias." Perhaps they in fact
meant to do something else. Moreover, we might ask if ordinary readers
of late 18th Century legal prose would have interpreted it as meaning
something else. The text at best provides only a starting point for a con-
versation. In this specific instance, it does not come close to resolving the
questions posed by federal regulation of arms. Even if we accept the pre-
amble as significant, we must still try to figure out what might be sug-
gested by guaranteeing to "the people the right to keep and bear arms;"
moreover, as we shall see presently, even the preamble presents unex-
pected difficulties in interpretation.
B. History
One might argue (and some have) that the substantive right is one per-
taining to a collective body-"the people"-rather than to individuals.
Professor Cress, for example, argues that state constitutions regularly used
the words "man" or "person" in regard to "individual rights such as free-
dom of conscience," whereas the use in those constitutions of the term
"the people" in regard to a right to bear arms is intended to refer to the
"sovereign citizenry" collectively organized.41 Such an argument founders,
however, upon examination of the text of the federal Bill of Rights itself
and the usage there of the term "the people" in the First, Fourth, Ninth,
and Tenth Amendments.
Consider that the Fourth Amendment protects "[tihe right of the people
to be secure in their persons," or that the First Amendment refers to the
"right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances." It is difficult to know how one might
plausibly read the Fourth Amendment as other than a protection of indi-
vidual rights, and it would approach the frivolous to read the assembly
and petition clause as referring only to the right of state legislatures to
meet and pass a remonstrance directed to Congress or the President
against some governmental act. The Tenth Amendment is trickier, though
it does explicitly differentiate between "states" and "the people" in terms
of retained rights.42 Concededly, it would be possible to read the Tenth
Amendment as suggesting only an ultimate right of revolution by the col-
lective people should the "states" stray too far from their designated role
of protecting the rights of the people. This reading follows directly from
the social contract theory of the state. (But, of course, many of these rights
are held by individuals.)
Although the record is suitably complicated, it seems tendentious to re-
41. Cress, An Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning of the Right to Bear Arms, 71 J.
At. HisT. 22, 31 (1984).
42. See U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
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ject out of hand the argument that one purpose of the Amendment was to
recognize an individual's right to engage in armed self-defense against
criminal conduct.43 Historian Robert E. Shalhope supports this view, ar-
guing in his article The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment44
that the Amendment guarantees individuals the right "to possess arms for
their own personal defense." '45 It would be especially unsurprising if this
were the case, given the fact that the development of a professional police
force (even within large American cities) was still at least a half century
away at the end of the colonial period.46 I shall return later in this essay
to this individualist notion of the Amendment, particularly in regard to
the argument that "changing circumstances," including the development
of a professional police force, have deprived it of any continuing plausibil-
ity. But I want now to explore a second possible purpose of the Amend-
ment, which as a sometime political theorist I find considerably more
interesting.
Assume, as Professor Cress has argued, that the Second Amendment
refers to a communitarian, rather than an individual, right.47 We are still
left the task of defining the relationship between the community and the
state apparatus. It is this fascinating problem to which I now turn.
Consider once more the preamble and its reference to the importance of
a well-regulated militia. Is the meaning of the term obvious? Perhaps we
should make some effort to find out what the term "militia" meant to
18th century readers and writers, rather than assume that it refers only to
Dan Quayle's Indiana National Guard and the like. By no means am I
arguing that the discovery of that meaning is dispositive as to the general
meaning of the Constitution for us today. But it seems foolhardy to be
entirely uninterested in the historical philology behind the Second
Amendment.
I, for one, have been persuaded that the term "militia" did not have the
limited reference that Professor Cress and many modern legal analysts
assign to it. There is strong evidence that "militia" refers to all of the
43. For a full articulation of the the individualist view of the Second Amendment, see Kates,
Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204
(1983). One can also find an efficient presentation of this view in Lund, supra note t, at 117.
44. Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 J. AM. HIsT. 599 (1982).
45. Id. at 614.
46. See Daniel Boorstin's laconic comment that "the requirements for self-defense and food-
gathering had put firearms in the hands of nearly everyone" in colonial America. D. BOORSTIN, THE
AMERICANS-THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 353 (1958). The beginnings of a professional police force
in Boston are traced in R. LANE, POLICING THE CITY: BOSTON 1822-1855 (1967). Lane argues that
as of the earlier of his two dates, "all the major eastern cities . . . had several kinds of officials serving
various police functions, all of them haphazardly inherited from the British and colonial past. These
agents were gradually drawn into better defined and more coherent organizations." Id. at 1. However,
as Oscar Handlin points out in his introduction to the book, "to bring into being a professional police
force was to create precisely the kind of hireling body considered dangerous by conventional political
theory." Id. at vii.
47. See Cress, supra note 41.
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people, or at least all of those treated as full citizens of the community.
Consider, for example, the question asked by George Mason, one of the
Virginians who refused to sign the Constitution because of its lack of a
Bill of Rights: "Who are the Militia? They consist now of the whole
people."4 Similarly, the Federal Farmer, one of the most important
Anti-Federalist opponents of the Constitution, referred to a "militia, when
properly formed, [as] in fact the people themselves." 9 We have, of course,
moved now from text to history. And this history is most interesting, espe-
cially when we look at the development of notions of popular sovereignty.
It has become almost a cliche of contemporary American historiography to
link the development of American political thought, including its constitu-
tional aspects, to republican thought in England, the "country" critique of
the powerful "court" centered in London.
One of this school's important writers, of course, was James Harring-
ton, who not only was influential at the time but also has recently been
given a certain pride of place by one of the most prominent of contempo-
rary "neo-republicans," Professor Frank Michelman. ° One historian de-
scribes Harrington as having made "the most significant contribution to
English libertarian attitudes toward arms, the individual, and society.""
He was a central figure in the development of the ideas of popular sover-
eignty and republicanism. 52 For Harrington, preservation of republican
liberty requires independence, which rests primarily on possession of ade-
quate property to make men free from coercion by employers or landlords.
But widespread ownership of land is not sufficient. These independent
yeoman should also bear arms. As Professor Morgan puts it, "[T]hese
independent yeomen, armed and embodied in a militia, are also a popular
government's best protection against its enemies, whether they be aggres-
sive foreign monarchs or scheming demagogues within the nation itself."53
A central fear of Harrington and of all future republicans was a stand-
ing army, composed of professional soldiers. Harrington and his fellow
republicans viewed a standing army as a threat to freedom, to be avoided
at almost all costs. Thus, says Morgan, "A militia is the only safe form of
military power that a popular government can employ; and because it is
48. 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE GENERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 425 (3d ed. 1937) (statement
of George Mason, June 14, 1788), reprinted in Kates, supra note 13, at 216 n.51.
49. LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN 123 (W. Bennett ed. 1978)
(ascribed to Richard Henry Lee), reprinted in Kates, supra note 13, at 216 n.51.
50. Nlichelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100
HARv. L. REV. 4, 39 (1986) (Harrington is "pivotal figure in the history of the 'Atlantic' branch of
republicanism that would find its way to America").
51. Shalhope, supra note 44, at 602.
52. Edmund Morgan discusses Harrington in his recent book, INVENTING THE PEOPLE 85-87
(1988) (analyzing notion of popular sovereignty in American thought).
53. Id. at 156.
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composed of the armed yeomanry, it will prevail over the mercenary pro-
fessionals who man the armies of neighboring monarchs."54
Scholars of the First Amendment have made us aware of the impor-
tance of John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, whose Cato's Letter's
were central to the formation of the American notion of freedom of the
press. That notion includes what Vincent Blasi would come to call the
"checking value" of a free press, which stands as a sturdy exposer of gov-
ernmental misdeeds.55 Consider the possibility, though, that the ultimate
"checking value" in a republican polity is the ability of an armed popu-
lace, presumptively motivated by a shared commitment to the common
good, to resist governmental tyranny.56 Indeed, one of Cato's letters refers
to "the Exercise of despotick Power [as] the unrelenting War of an armed
Tyrant upon his unarmed Subjects. . ...,'
Cress persuasively shows that no one defended universal possession of
arms. New Hampshire had no objection to disarming those who "are or
have been in actual rebellion," just as Samuel Adams stressed that only
"peaceable citizens" should be protected in their right of "keeping their
own arms."5 8 All these points can be conceded, however, without conced-
ing as well that Congress-or, for that matter, the States-had the power
to disarm these "peaceable citizens."
Surely one of the foundations of American political thought of the pe-
riod was the well-justified concern about political corruption and conse-
quent governmental tyranny. Even the Federalists, fending off their oppo-
nents who accused them of foisting an oppressive new scheme upon the
American people, were careful to acknowledge the risks of tyranny. James
Madison, for example, speaks in Federalist Number Forty-Six of "the
advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of
54. Id. at 157. Morgan argues, incidentally, that the armed yeomanry was neither effective as a
fighting force nor particularly protective of popular liberty, but that is another matter. For our pur-
poses, the ideological perceptions are surely more important than the "reality" accompanying them.
Id. at 160-65.
55. Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AN. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521.
56. See Lund, supra note tf, at 111-16.
57. Shalhope, supra note 44, at 603 (quoting 1755 edition of Cato's Letters).
Shalhope also quotes from James Burgh, another English writer well known to American
revolutionaries:
The possession of arms is the distinction between a freeman and a slave. He, who has nothing,
and who himself belongs to another, must be defended by him, whose property he is, and needs
no arms. But he, who thinks he is his own master, and has what he can call his own, ought to
have arms to defend himself, and what he possesses; else he lives precariously, and at
discretion.
Id. at 604. To be sure, Burgh also wrote that only men of property should in fact comprise the
militia: "A militia consisting of any others than the men of property in a country, is no militia; but a
mungrel army." Cress, supra note 41, at 27 (emphasis in original) (quoting J. BURGH, 2 POLITICAL
DISQUISITIONS: OR, AN ENQUIRY INTO PUBLIC ERRORS, DEFECTS, AND ABUSES (1774-75). Pre-
sumably, though, the widespread distribution of property would bring with it equally widespread
access to arms and membership in the militia.
58. See Cress, supra note 41, at 34.
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almost every other nation." 59 The advantage in question was not merely
the defense of American borders; a standing army might well accomplish
that. Rather, an armed public was advantageous in protecting political
liberty. It is therefore no surprise that the Federal Farmer, the nom de
plume of an anti-federalist critic of the new Constitution and its absence
of a Bill of Rights, could write that "to preserve liberty, it is essential that
the whole body of the people always possess arms, and be taught alike,
especially when young, how to use them .. ."" On this matter, at least,
there was no cleavage between the pro-ratification Madison and his
opponent.
In his influential Commentaries on the Constitution, Joseph Story, cer-
tainly no friend of Anti-Federalism, emphasized the "importance" of the
Second Amendment.' He went on to describe the militia as "the natural
defence of a free country" not only "against sudden foreign invasions" and
"domestic insurrections," with which one might well expect a Federalist
to be concerned, but also against "domestic usurpations of power by rul-
ers." 2 "The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been
considered," Story wrote, "as the palladium of the liberties of a republic;
since it offers a strong moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary
power of rulers; and will generally, even if these are successful in the first
instance, enable the people to resist and triumph over them." 3
We also see this blending of individualist and collective accounts of the
right to bear arms in remarks by Judge Thomas Cooley, one of the most
influential 19th century constitutional commentators. Noting that the state
might call into its official militia only "a small number" of the eligible
citizenry, Cooley wrote that "if the right [to keep and bear arms] were
limited to those enrolled, the purpose of this guaranty might be defeated
altogether by the action or neglect to act of the government it was meant
to hold in check."6 4 Finally, it is worth noting the remarks of Theodore
59. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 299 (J. Madsion) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
60. LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN 124 (W. Bennett ed. 1978).
61. 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES § 1890 (1833), quoted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION
214 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987).
62. Id.
63. Id. Lawrence Cress, despite his forceful critique of Shalhope's individualist rendering of the
Sccund Amendment, nonetheless himself notes that "Ithe danger posed by manipulating demagogues,
ambitious rulers, and foreign invaders to free institutions required the vigilance of citizen-soldiers
cognizant of the common good." Cress, supra note 41, at 41 (emphasis added).
64. T. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
oF AMEiRIC, 298 (3d ed 1898):
The right of the people to bear arms in their own defence, and to form and drill military
organizations in defence of the State, may not be very important in this country, but it is
significant as having been reserved by the people as a possible and necessary resort for the
protection of ,elf-government against usurpation, and against any attempt on the part of those
who may for the time be in possession of State authority or resources to set aside the constitu-
tion and substitute their own rule for that of the people. Should the contingency ever arise
when it would be necessary for the people to make use of the arms in their hands for the
protection of constitutional liberty, the proceeding, so far from being revolutionary, would be
in strict accord with popular right and duty.
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Schroeder, one of the most important developers of the theory of freedom
of speech early in this century. 5 "[T]he obvious import [of the constitu-
tional guarantee to carry arms]," he argues, "is to promote a state of
preparedness for self-defense even against the invasions of government,
because only governments have ever disarmed any considerable class of
people as a means toward their enslavement. "66
Such analyses provide the basis for Edward Abbey's revision of a com-
mon bumper sticker, "If guns are outlawed, only the government will
have guns."'67 One of the things this slogan has helped me to understand is
the political tilt contained within the Weberian definition of the
state-i.e., the repository of a monopoly of the legitimate means of vio-
lence 68-that is so commonly used by political scientists. It is a profoundly
statist definition, the product of a specifically German tradition of the
(strong) state rather than of a strikingly different American political tradi-
tion that is fundamentally mistrustful of state power and vigilant about
maintaining ultimate power, including the power of arms, in the
populace.
We thus see what I think is one of the most interesting points in regard
to the new historiography of the Second Amendment-its linkage to con-
ceptions of republican political order. Contemporary admirers of republi-
can theory use it as a source both of critiques of more individualist liberal
theory and of positive insight into the way we today might reorder our
political lives.69 One point of emphasis for neo-republicans is the value of
participation in government, as contrasted to mere representation by a dis-
tant leadership, even if formally elected. But the implications of republi-
canism might push us in unexpected, even embarrassing, directions: just
as ordinary citizens should participate actively in governmental decision-
making through offering their own deliberative insights, rather than be
confined to casting ballots once every two or four years for those very few
individuals who will actually make decisions, so should ordinary citizens
participate in the process of law enforcement and defense of liberty rather
Cooley advanced this same idea in The Abnegation of Self-Government, 12 PRINCETON REV. 213-14
(1883).
65. See Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514, 560 (1981)
("[Plrodigious theoretical writings of Theodore Schroeder... were the most extensive and liberta-
rian treatments of freedom of speech in the prewar period"); see also GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE
SPEECH (forthcoming 1990) (manuscript at 4-12; on file with author).
66. T. SCHROEDER, FREE SPEECH FOR RADICALS 104 (reprint ed. 1969).
67. Shalhope, supra note 44, at 45.
68. See M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 156 (T. Parsons
ed. 1947), where he lists among "[tihe primary formal characteristics of the modern state" the fact
that:
to-day, the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the state
or prescribed by it . . . .The claim of the modem state to monopolize the use of force is as
essential to it as its character of compulsory jurisdiction and of continuous organization.
69. See, e.g., Symposium: The Republican Civil Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493-1723 (1988).
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than rely on professionalized peacekeepers, whether we call them standing
armies or police.
C. Structure
We have also passed imperceptibly into a form of structural argument,
for we see that one aspect of the structure of checks and balances within
the purview of 18th century thought was the armed citizen. That is, those
who would limit the meaning of the Second Amendment to the constitu-
tional protection of state-controlled militias agree that such protection
rests on the perception that militarily competent states were viewed as a
potential protection against a tyrannical national government. Indeed, in
1801 several governors threatened to call out state militias if the Federal-
ists in Congress refused to elect Thomas Jefferson president."0 But this
argument assumes that there are only two basic components in the vertical
structure of the American polity-the national government and the states.
It ignores the implication that might be drawn from the Second, Ninth,
and Tenth Amendments: the citizenry itself can be viewed as an impor-
tant third component of republican governance insofar as it stands ready
to defencs republican liberty against the depredations of the other two
structures, however futile that might appear as a practical matter.
One implication of this republican rationale for the Second Amendment
is that it calls into question the ability of a state to disarm its citizenry.
That is, the strongest version of the republican argument would hold it to
be a "privilege and immunity of United States citizenship"-of member-
ship in a liberty-enhancing political order-to keep arms that could be
taken up against tyranny wherever found, including, obviously, state gov-
ernment. Ironically, the principal citation supporting this argument is to
Chief Justice Taney's egregious opinion in Dred Scott,71 where he sug-
gested that an uncontroversial attribute of citizenship, in addition to the
right to migrate from one state to another, was the right to possess arms.
The logic of Taney's argument at this point seems to be that, because it
was inconceivable that the Framers could have genuinely imagined blacks
having the right to possess arms, it follows that they could not have envi-
sioned them as being citizens, since citizenship entailed that right. Taney's
seeming recognition of a right to arms is much relied on by opponents of
gun control.7 2 Indeed, recall Madison's critique, in Federalist Numbers
Ten and Fourteen, of republicanism's traditional emphasis on the desira-
70. See D. MALONE, 4 JEFFERSON AND His TIMEs: JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM,
1801-1805, at 7-11 (1970) (republican leaders ready to use state militias to resist should lame duck
Congre.- attempt to violate clear dictates of Article II by designating someone other than Thomas
Jefferson as President in 1801).
71. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 417 (1857).
72. See, e.g., Featherstone, Gardiner & Dowlut, The Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution Guarantees an Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms, in THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND
BEAR ARMIS, supra note 27, at 100.
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bility of small states as preservers of republican liberty. He transformed
this debate by arguing that the states would be less likely to preserve lib-
erty because they could so easily fall under the sway of a local dominant
faction, whereas an extended republic would guard against this danger.
Anyone who accepts the Madisonian argument could scarcely be happy
enhancing the powers of the states over their own citizens; indeed, this has
been one of the great themes of American constitutional history, as the
nationalization of the Bill of Rights has been deemed necessary in order to
protect popular liberty against state depredation.
D. Doctrine
Inevitably one must at least mention, even though there is not space to
discuss fully, the so-called incorporation controversy regarding the appli-
cation of the Bill of Rights to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. It should be no surprise that the opponents of gun control appear to
take a "full incorporationist" view of that Amendment.7 3 They view the
privileges and immunities clause, which was eviscerated in the Slaughter-
house Cases, 4 as designed to require the states to honor the rights that
had been held, by Justice Marshall in Barron v. Baltimore in 1833,5 to
restrict only the national government. In 1875 the Court stated, in United
States v. Cruikshank,6 that the Second Amendment, insofar as it grants
any right at all, "means no more than that it shall not be infringed by
Congress. This is one of the amendments that has no other effect than to
restrict the powers of the national government. . ." Lest there be any re-
maining doubt on this point, the Court specifically cited the Cruikshank
language eleven years later in Presser v. Illinois,77 in rejecting the claim
that the Second Amendment served to invalidate an Illinois statute that
prohibited "any body of men whatever, other than the regular organized
volunteer militia of this State, and the troops of the United States. . .to
drill or parade with arms in any city, or town, of this State, without the
license of the Governor thereof. ... ,,8
73. See, e.g., Halbrook, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms: The
Intent of the Framers, in THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 27, at 79. Not the least
of the ironies observed in the debate about the Second Amendment is that N.R.A.-oriented conserva-
tives like Senator Hatch could scarcely have been happy with the wholesale attack leveled by former
Attorney General Meese on the incorporation doctrine, for here is one area where some "conserva-
tives" may in fact be more zealous adherents of that doctrine than are most liberals, who, at least
where the Second Amendment is concerned, have a considerably more selective view of incorporation.
74. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
75. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
76. 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875).
77. 116 U.S. 252, 267 (1886). For a fascinating discussion of Presser, see Larue, supra note 13,
at 386-90.
78. 116 U.S. at 253. There is good reason to believe this statute, passed by the Illinois legislature
in 1879, was part of an effort to control (and, indeed, suppress) widespread labor unrest linked to the
economic troubles of the time. For the background of the Illinois statute, see P. AVRICH, THE
HAYMARKET TRAGEDY 45 (1984):
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The first "incorporation decision," Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chi-
cago,79 was not delivered until eleven years after Presser; one therefore
cannot know if the judges in Cruikshank and Presser were willing to con-
cede that any of the amendments comprising the Bill of Rights were any-
thing more than limitations on congressional or other national power. The
obvious question, given the modern legal reality of the incorporation of
almost all of the rights protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and
Eighth Amendments, is what exactly justifies treating the Second Amend-
ment as the great exception. Why, that is, should Cruikshank and Presser
be regarded as binding precedent any more than any of the other "pre-
incorporation" decisions refusing to apply given aspects of the Bill of
Rights against the states?
If one agrees with Professor Tribe that the Amendment is simply a
federalist protection of state rights, then presumably there is nothing to
incorporate.80 If, however, one accepts the Amendment as a serious sub-
stantive limitation on the ability of the national government to regulate
the private possession of arms based on either the "individualist" or "neo-
republican" theories sketched above, then why not follow the "incorpora-
tionist" logic applied to other amendments and limit the states as well in
their powers to regulate (and especially to prohibit) such possession? The
As early as 1875, a small group of Chicago socialists, most of them German immigrants, had
formed an armed club to protect the workers against police and military assaults, as well as
against physical intimidation at the polls. In the eyes of its supporters . . . the need for such a
group was amply demonstrated by the behavior of the police and [state-controlled] militia dur-
ing the Great Strike of 1877, a national protest by labor triggered by a ten percent cut in
wages by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, which included the breaking up of workers' meet-
ings, the arrest of socialist leaders, [and] the use of club, pistol, and bayonet against strikers
and their supporters . . . .Workers ...were resolved never again to be shot and beaten
without resistance. Nor would they stand idly by while their meeting places were invaded or
their wives and children assaulted. They were determined, as Albert Parsons [a leader of the
anarchist movement in Chicago] expressed it, to defend both "their persons and their rights."
79. 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (protecting rights of property owners by requiring compensation for
takings of property).
80. My colleague Douglas Laycock has reminded me that a similar argument was made by some
conservatives in regard to the establishment clause of the First Amendment. Thus, Justice Brennan
noted that "[ilt has been suggested, with some support in history, that absorption of the First Amend-
ment's ban against congressional legislation 'respecting an establishment of religion' is conceptually
impossible because the Framers meant the Establishment Clause also to foreclose any attempt by
Congress to disestablish the existing official state churches." Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 254 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). According to this reading, it would
be illogical to apply the establishment clause against the states "because that clause is not one of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights which in terms protects a 'freedom' of the individual," id. at 256,
inasmuch as it is only a federalist protection of states against a national establishment (or disestablish-
ment). "The fallacy in this contention," responds Brennan, "is that it underestimates the role of the
Establishment Clause as a co-guarantor, with the Free Exercise Clause, of religious liberty." Id.
Whatever the sometimes bitter debates about the precise meaning of "establishment," it is surely the
case that Justice Brennan, even as he almost cheerfully concedes that at one point in our history the
"states-right" reading of the establishment clause would have been thoroughly plausible, expresses
what has become the generally accepted view as to the establishment clause being some kind of limita-
tion on the state as well as on the national government. One may wonder whether the interpretive
history of the establishment clause might have any lessons for the interpretation of the Second
Amendment.
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Supreme Court has almost shamelessly refused to discuss the issue,"' but
that need not stop the rest of us.
Returning, though, to the question of Congress' power to regulate the
keeping and bearing of arms, one notes that there is, basically, only one
modern case that discusses the issue, United States v. Miller,82 decided in
1939. Jack Miller was charged with moving a sawed-off shotgun in inter-
state commerce in violation of the National Firearms Act of 1934. Among
other things, Miller and a compatriot had not registered the firearm, as
required by the Act. The court below had dismissed the charge, accepting
Miller's argument that the Act violated the Second Amendment.
The Supreme Court reversed unanimously, with the arch-conservative
Justice McReynolds writing the opinion. 8 Interestingly enough, he em-
phasized that there was no evidence showing that a sawed-off shotgun "at
this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency
of a well regulated militia."'84 And "[c]ertainly it is not within judicial
notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or
that its use could contribute to the common defense."88 Miller might have
had a tenable argument had he been able to show that he was keeping or
bearing a weapon that clearly had a potential military use.88
Justice McReynolds went on to describe the purpose of the Second
Amendment as "assur[ing] the continuation and render[ing] possible the
effectiveness of [the Militia]. 87 He contrasted the Militia with troops of a
standing army, which the Constitution indeed forbade the states to keep
without the explicit consent of Congress. "The sentiment of the time
strongly disfavored standing armies; the common view was that adequate
defense of country and laws could be secured through the Mili-
tia-civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion."88 McReynolds noted fur-
ther that "the debates in the Convention, the history and legislation of
Colonies and States, and the writings of approved commentators [all]
[s]how plainly enough that the Militia comprised all males physically ca-
pable of acting in concert for the common defense."8
It is difficult to read Miller as rendering the Second Amendment mean-
ingless as a control on Congress. Ironically, Miller can be read to support
81. It refused, for example, to review the most important modern gun control cast, Quilici v.
Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983), where the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a local ordinance in Morton Grove, Illinois, prohibiting the
possession of handguns within its borders.
82. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
83. Justice Douglas, however, did not participate in the case.
84. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
85. Id. at 178 (citation omitted).
86. Lund notes that "commentators have since demonstrated that sawed-off or short-barreled
shotguns are commonly used as military weapons." Lund, supra note t, at 109.
87. 307 U.S. at 178.




some of the most extreme anti-gun control arguments, e.g., that the indi-
vidual citizen has a right to keep and bear bazookas, rocket launchers, and
other armaments that are clearly relevant to modern warfare, including, of
course, assault weapons. Arguments about the constitutional legitimacy of
a prohibition by Congress of private ownership of handguns or, what is
much more likely, assault rifles, might turn on the usefulness of such guns
in military settings.
E. Prudentialism
We have looked at four of Bobbitt's categories-text, history, structure,
and caselaw doctrine-and have seen, at the very least, that the arguments
on behalf of a "strong" Second Amendment are stronger than many of us
might wish were the case. This, then, brings us to the fifth category,
prudentialism, or an attentiveness to practical consequences, which is
clearly of great importance in any debates about gun control. The stan-
dard argument in favor of strict control and, ultimately, prohibition of
private ownership focuses on the extensive social costs of widespread dis-
tribution of firearms. Consider, for example, a recent speech given by for-
mer Justice Lewis Powell to the American Bar Association. He noted that
over 40,000 murders were committed in the United States in 1986 and
1987, and that fully sixty percent of them were committed with firearms.
England and Wales, however, saw only 662 homicides in 1986, less than
eight percent of which were committed with firearms. 90 Justice Powell
indicated that, "[wlith respect to handguns," in contrast "to sporting rifles
and shotguns[,] it is not easy to understand why the Second Amendment,
or the notion of liberty, should be viewed as creating a right to own and
carry a weapon that contributes so directly to the shocking number of
murders in our society."'"
It is hard to disagree with Justice Powell; it appears almost crazy to
protect as a constitutional right something that so clearly results in ex-
traordinary social costs with little, if any, compensating social advantage.
Indeed, since Justice Powell's talk, the subject of assault rifles has become
a staple of national discussion, and the opponents of regulation of such
weapons have deservedly drawn the censure even of conservative leaders
like William Bennett. It is almost impossible to imagine that the judiciary
would strike down a determination by Congress that the possession of as-
sault weapons should be denied to private citizens.
Even if one accepts the historical plausibility of the arguments advanced
above, the overriding temptation is to say that times and circumstances
have changed and that there is simply no reason to continue enforcing an
90. L. Powell, Capital Punishment, Remarks Delivered to the Criminal Justice Section, ABA 10
(Aug. 7, 1988).
91. Id. at 11.
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outmoded, and indeed, dangerous, understanding of private rights against
public order. This criticism is clearest in regard to the so-called individu-
alist argument, for one can argue that the rise of a professional police
force to enforce the law has made irrelevant, and perhaps even counter-
productive, the continuation of a strong notion of self-help as the remedy
for crime.92
I am not unsympathetic to such arguments. It is no purpose of this
essay to solicit membership for the National Rifle Association or to ex-
press any sympathy for what even Don Kates, a strong critic of the con-
ventional dismissal of the Second Amendment, describes as "the gun
lobby's obnoxious habit of assailing all forms of regulation on 2nd
Amendment grounds."9 And yet ....
Circumstances may well have changed in regard to individual defense,
although we ignore at our political peril the good-faith belief of many
Americans that they cannot rely on the police for protection against a
variety of criminals. Still, let us assume that the individualist reading of
the Amendment has been vitiated by changing circumstances. Are we
quite so confident that circumstances are equally different in regard to the
republican rationale outlined earlier?
One would, of course, like to believe that the state, whether at the local
or national level, presents no threat to important political values, includ-
ing liberty. But our propensity to believe that this is the case may be little
more than a sign of how truly different we are from our radical forbear-
ers. I do not want to argue that the state is necessarily tyrannical; I am
not an anarchist. But it seems foolhardy to assume that the armed state
will necessarily be benevolent. The American political tradition is, for
good or ill, based in large measure on a healthy mistrust of the state. The
development of widespread suffrage and greater majoritarianism in our
polity is itself no sure protection, at least within republican theory. The
republican theory is predicated on the stark contrast between mere democ-
rac.y, where people are motivated by selfish personal interest, and a re-
public, where civic virtue, both in citizens and leadership, tames selfish-
ness on behalf of the common good. In any event, it is hard for me to see
how one can argue that circumstances have so changed as to make mass
disarmament constitutionally unproblematic.94
Indeed, only in recent months have we seen the brutal suppression of
the Chinese student demonstrations in Tianamen Square. It should not
surprise us that some N.R.A. sympathizers have presented that situation
as an object lesson to those who unthinkingly support the prohibition of
92. This point is presumably demonstrated by the increasing public opposition of police officials
to private possession of handguns (not to mention assault rifles).
93. D. Kates, Minimalist Interpretation of the Second Amendment 2 (draft Sept. 29, 1986) (un-
published manuscript available from author).
94. See Lund, supra note t, at 116.
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private gun ownership. "[I]f all Chinese citizens kept arms, their rulers
would hardly have dared to massacre the demonstrators . . . The pri-
vate keeping of hand-held personal firearms is within the constitutional
design for a counter to government run amok . . . . As the Tianamen
Square tragedy showed so graphically, AK-47s fall into that category of
weapons, and that is why they are protected by the Second Amend-
ment. '"" It is simply silly to respond that small arms are irrelevant
against nuclear-armed states: Witness contemporary Northern Ireland
and the territories occupied by Israel, where the sophisticated weaponry of
Great Britain and Israel have proved almost totally beside the point. The
fact that these may not be pleasant examples does not affect the principal
point, that a state facing a totally disarmed population is in a far better
position, for good or for ill, to suppress popular demonstrations and upris-
ings than one that must calculate the possibilities of its soldiers and offi-
cials being injured or killed. 6
III. TAKING THE SECOND AMENDMENT SERIOUSLY
There is one further problem of no small import: If one does accept the
plausibility of any of the arguments on behalf of a strong reading of the
Second Amendment, but, nevertheless, rejects them in the name of social
prudence and the present-day consequences produced by finicky adherence
to earlier understandings, why do we not apply such consequentialist cri-
teria to each and every part of the Bill of Rights?97 As Ronald Dworkin
95. Wimmershoff-Caplan, The Founders and the AK-47, Washington Post, July 6, 1989, at
AI8, col. 4, reprinted as Price of Gun Deaths Small Compared to Price of Liberty, Austin American-
Statesman, July 11, 1989, at All. Ms. Wimmershoff-Caplan is identified as a "lawyer in New York"
who is "a member of the National Board of the National Rifle Association." Id. One of the first such
arguments in regard to the events at Tianamen Square was made by William A. Black in a letter,
Citizens Without Guns, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1989 at D26, col. 6. Though describing himself as
"findling] no glory in guns (and] a very profound anti-hunter," he nonetheless "stand[s] with those
who would protect our right to keep and bear arms" and cited for support the fact that "none [of the
Chinese soldiers] feared bullets: the citizens of China were long ago disarmed by the Communists."
"Who knows," he asks, "what the leaders and the military and the police of our America will be up
to at some point in the future? We need an armed citizenry to protect our liberty."
As one might expect, such arguments draw heated responses. See Rudlin, The Founders and the
AK-47 (Cont'd), Washington Post, July 20, 1989, at A22, col. 3. Jonathan Rudlin accused Ms. Wim-
mershoff-Caplan of engaging in Swiftian satire, as no one could "take such brilliant burlesque seri-
ously " Neal Knox, however, endorsed her essay in full, adding the Holocaust to the list of examples:
"Could the Holocaust have occurred if Europe's Jews had owned thousands of then-modern military
Mauser bolt action rifles?" See also Washington Post, July 12, 1989, at A22, for other letters.
96. See Lund, supra note t, at 115:
The decision to use military force is not determined solely by whether the contemplated bene-
fits can be succesfully obtained through the use of available forces, but rather is determined by
the ratio of those benefits to the expected costs. It follows that any factor increasing the antici-
pated cost of a military operation makes the conduct of that operation incrementally more
unlikely. This explains why a relatively poorly armed nation with a small population recently
prevailed in a war against the United States, and it explains why governments bent on the
oppression of their people almost always disarm the civilian population before undertaking
more drastically oppressive measures.
97. See D. Kates, supra note 93, at 24-25 n.13, for a discussion of this point.
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has argued, what it means to take rights seriously is that one will honor
them even when there is significant social cost in doing so. If protecting
freedom of speech, the rights of criminal defendants, or any other part of
the Bill of Rights were always (or even most of the time) clearly costless
to the society as a whole, it would truly be impossible to understand why
they would be as controversial as they are. The very fact that there are
often significant costs-criminals going free, oppressed groups having to
hear viciously racist speech and so on-helps to account for the observed
fact that those who view themselves as defenders of the Bill of Rights are
generally antagonistic to prudential arguments. Most often, one finds
them embracing versions of textual, historical, or doctrinal argument that
dismiss as almost crass and vulgar any insistence that times might have
changed and made too "expensive" the continued adherence to a given
view. "Cost-benefit" analysis, rightly or wrongly, has come to be viewed
as a "conservative" weapon to attack liberal rights. 8 Yet one finds that
the tables are strikingly turned when the Second Amendment comes into
play. Here it is "conservatives" who argue in effect that social costs are
irrelevant and "liberals" who argue for a notion of the "living Constitu-
tion" and "changed circumstances" that would have the practical conse-
quence of removing any real bite from the Second Amendment.
As Fred Donaldson of Austin, Texas wrote, commenting on those who
defended the Supreme Court's decision upholding flag-burning as com-
pelled by a proper (and decidedly non-prudential) understanding of the
First Amendment, "[I]t seems inconsistent for [defenders of the decision]
to scream so loudly" at the prospect of limiting the protection given ex-
pression "while you smile complacently at the Second torn and bleeding.
If the Second Amendment is not worth the paper it is written on, what
price the First?" '99 The fact that Mr. Donaldson is an ordinary citizen
rather than an eminent law professor does not make his question any less
pointed or its answer less difficult.
For too long, most members of the legal academy have treated the Sec-
ond Amendment as the equivalent of an embarrassing relative, whose
mention brings a quick change of subject to other, more respectable, fam-
ily members. That will no longer do. It is time for the Second Amendment
to enter full scale into the consciousness of the legal academy. Those of us
who agree with Martha Minow's emphasis on the desirability of encour-
98. See, e.g., Justice Marshall's dissent, joined by Justice Brennan, in Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executive Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989), upholding the government's right to require drug tests of
railroad employees following accidents. It begins with his chastising the majority for "ignor[ing] the
text and doctrinal history of the Fourth Amendment, which require that highly intrusive searches of
this type be based on probable cause, not on the evanescent cost-benefit calculations of agencies or
judges," id. at 1423, and continues by arguing that "[tlhe majority's concern with the railroad safety
problems caused by drug and alcohol abuse is laudable; its cavalier disregard for the Constitution is
not. There is no drug exception to the Constitution, any more than there is a communism exception or
an exception for other real or imagined sources of domestic unrest." Id. at 1426.
99. Donaldson, Letter to the Editor, Austin American-Statesman, July 8, 1989, at A19, col. 4.
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aging different "voices" in the legal conversation. should be especially
aware of the importance of recognizing the attempts of Mr. Donaldson
and his millions of colleagues to join the conversation. To be sure, it is
unlikely that Professor Minow had those too often peremptorily dismissed
as "gun nuts" in mind as possible providers of "insight and growth," but
surely the call for sensitivity to different or excluded voices cannot extend
only to those groups "we" already, perhaps "complacent[ly]," believe have
a lot to tell "us." 01 I am not so naive as to believe that conversation will
overcome the chasm that now separates the sensibility of, say, Senator
Hatch and myself as to what constitutes the "right[s] most valued by free
men [and women]." 10 2 It is important to remember that one will still need
to join up sides and engage in vigorous political struggle. But it might at
least help to make the political sides appear more human to one another.
Perhaps "we" might be led to stop referring casually to "gun nuts" just
as, maybe, members of the NRA could be brought to understand the real
fear that the currently almost uncontrolled system of gun ownership
sparks in the minds of many whom they casually dismiss as "bleeding-
heart liberals." Is not, after all, the possibility of serious, engaged discus-
sion about political issues at the heart of what is most attractive in both
liberal and republican versions of politics?
100. See Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV.
L REV. 10, 74-90 (1987). "We need settings in which to engage in the clash of realities that breaks
us out of settled and complacent meanings and creates opportunities for insight and growth." Id. at
95; see also Getman, Voices, 66 TEx. L. REv. 577 (1988).
101. And, perhaps more to the point, "you" who insufficiently listen to "us" and to "our" favored
groups.
102. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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